Anglo-German Agreement 1900
By this policy of encirclement, the British government unilaterally scrapped the maritime agreement of 18 June 1935, which put an end to this agreement and the supplementary declaration of 17 July 1937. It was on this basis and under these conditions that the Anglo-German naval agreement came into force on 18 June 1935. This was expressed by both parties in agreement with the conclusion of the agreement. Moreover, last autumn, at the end of the Munich conference, the German Chancellor and the British Prime Minister solemnly confirmed in their signed declaration that they consider the agreement to be a symbol of the desire of the two peoples never to go to war again. The same applies to Part III of the Anglo-German naval agreement of 17 July 1937, which defines the obligation to exchange reciprocal Anglo-German information. Compliance with this obligation naturally rests on the condition of a relationship of trust between two partners. To the extent that the German government can no longer, to its regret, regard this relationship as existing, it must also regard the aforementioned provisions of Part III as obsolete. The qualitative provisions of the Anglo-German agreement of 17 July 1937 are not affected by these findings imposed on the German government against its will. The German government will continue to respect these provisions, thus helping to avoid a universally unlimited race in the naval armament of nations. Moreover, if the British government wishes to start negotiations with Germany on future problems, the German government is prepared to do so. It would like to see a clear and categorical understanding possible on a safe basis. When, in 1935, the German government proposed to the British government to bring the strength of the German fleet to a fixed share of the British Empire naval force force through a contract, this was based on the firm conviction that the resurgence of an armed conflict between Germany and Great Britain was still excluded. By voluntarily acknowledging the priority of British interests at sea through the offer of the 100:35 report, she believed that with this decision unique in the history of the great powers, she was taking a step that would lead to the establishment of a friendly relationship forever between the two nations.
This approach by the German government naturally depended on the British government`s determination to adopt a political position that would ensure a friendly development of Anglo-German relations. . Sales operations are carried out directly in the full text box on the left. Among the paragraphs, the German government has always stood by this wish and is still inspired by it today. It is aware that it acted accordingly in its policy and that it did not in any way interfere in the field of English interests or that it intervened in any way in those interests. On the other hand, it must note, to its great regret, that the British Government, in recent times, has increasingly strayed from the direction of a similar policy towards Germany. As the political decisions taken by the British government in recent weeks and the anti-German attitude inspired by the English press make clear, the British government is now dominated by the idea that England, regardless of Europe where Germany is involved in armed conflict, must always adopt an anti-German attitude. , even in a case where English interests are in no way affected by such a conflict.